An election campaign is no longer fought only at rallies, in televised debates or through official statements. A growing part of the competition for attention takes place on digital platforms, where the visibility, speed of dissemination and repetition of a message can affect public perception.
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This is the context in which bots in political campaigns become relevant: automated or partially automated accounts capable of publishing, sharing or interacting with content on a large scale. As with online bots more generally, the problem is not the technology itself, but how it is used. The risk emerges when these tools are placed within coordinated networks designed to amplify particular narratives, simulate consensus or increase the visibility of manipulative content.
Understanding these mechanisms is essential to understanding how political reputation management works: it is not only what is said about a leader that matters, but also how and through which networks that message is able to circulate and influence public perception.
What are bots in political campaigns?
A social bot is software that automates activities normally performed by a user: publishing content, sharing it, following accounts or interacting with particular messages.
However, bots, fake profiles and coordinated accounts are not synonymous. A fake account can be managed by a person; several authentic accounts can act in a coordinated manner; a bot can automate activities without necessarily spreading disinformation.
This distinction is essential. The reputational problem does not arise from automation alone, but from its use within strategies capable of artificially altering the conversation and making it difficult to distinguish spontaneous interactions from behaviour designed to produce a particular effect.
How bots in political campaigns amplify a message
The influence of bots in political campaigns does not necessarily require the creation of a false story. It may be enough to alter the perceived visibility of a piece of content.
Imagine that a controversial statement by a candidate is picked up simultaneously by hundreds of accounts. Shares, similar comments and synchronised interactions can give observers the impression that the topic is spontaneously dominating the debate.
This is where the manipulation of consensus comes into play. The aim may not be to persuade a voter directly, but to create the impression that a position is more widespread, contested or supported than would emerge from organic interactions alone.
The third European External Action Service report on FIMI threats, published in March 2025, helps explain the structure of the phenomenon. The analysis examines 505 incidents collected in 2024 and linked to around 38,000 channels, revealing a digital infrastructure distributed across different platforms and geographical areas. The report also highlights how official and attributed channels can interact with less visible networks capable of amplifying and reinforcing particular narratives.
The point, therefore, is not simply how many accounts participate in a campaign. It is the ability of a network to replicate a narrative until it alters its perceived visibility, making it more difficult to distinguish spontaneous dissemination from coordinated amplification.
From amplification to political reputation
For a politician, reputation encompasses different perceptions: credibility, competence, integrity, leadership and consistency. Coordinated networks can intervene precisely in these areas by amplifying existing allegations, resurfacing negative episodes or continuously associating a name with particular interpretations.
Repetition does not make information true, but it can increase its presence in the information environment.
This is why measuring positive or negative sentiment is not enough. It is necessary to understand who generates the conversation, how they do so and whether particular spikes in activity genuinely correspond to a spontaneous public reaction.
Disinformation and online propaganda: false content is not always necessary
Contemporary online propaganda can be more sophisticated than spreading an easily verifiable false story. A manipulative strategy can use real facts selectively, remove their context, recirculate old statements as if they were current, or multiply a particular interpretation.
The relationship between fake news and online reputation shows how decisive context can be: content can have reputational consequences even when the manipulation depends on how it is presented and distributed.
In February 2025, the European Commission and the European Board for Digital Services approved the integration of the previous Code of Practice on Disinformation into the Digital Services Act framework, recognising it as the Code of Conduct on Disinformation. The conversion took effect on 1 July 2025, and the Code serves as a reference for assessing the DSA compliance of the large operators that have signed it. The commitments cover areas such as demonetisation, political advertising, fact-checking and tools for users.
The principle is important: countering disinformation does not mean intervening only against an individual piece of false content. It also means acting on the ecosystem through which a narrative can gain distribution, visibility and credibility.
Elections: why platform transparency is crucial
During an election campaign, understanding why a message reaches particular people can be as important as analysing its content.
In February 2025, the European Commission published the DSA Elections Toolkit, an operational resource for Digital Services Coordinators designed to protect the integrity of electoral processes. The framework addresses risks such as the manipulation of public opinion, online harassment, impersonation and phenomena involving AI-generated content.
The logic is also relevant from a reputational perspective: protecting the integrity of the conversation does not mean deciding which opinion should prevail. It means making it harder for opaque mechanisms to make artificially amplified content appear authentic.
AI and bots: manipulation becomes more scalable
Artificial intelligence adds another layer. Generative systems can create, adapt and translate content rapidly, making it easier to produce variations of the same message and sustain conversations on a large scale.
AI and automation can therefore reduce the resources needed to keep a narrative constantly present in the digital space.
This is where the relationship between political reputation and AI becomes strategic. A public figure may simultaneously be exposed to the manipulation of social media conversations and the subsequent reprocessing of information by artificial intelligence systems.
The risk no longer concerns only the initial dissemination of content, but also the possibility that a narrative may enter the information ecosystem from which other systems retrieve and synthesise information.
How to recognise possible artificial amplification
There is no single signal capable of proving that a conversation has been manipulated. The overall behaviour of the network must be observed.
Indicators to analyse include:
- sudden spikes in posts;
- identical or highly similar texts;
- accounts created during the same period;
- unusual sharing sequences;
- synchronisation between different profiles.
None of these elements, taken in isolation, proves the existence of a coordinated campaign. It is the combination of signals, observed in context, that justifies a more detailed analysis.
For political figures and institutions, effective reputational risk analysis must therefore go beyond counting mentions and reconstruct the origin, dissemination and authenticity of the conversations that are changing public perception.
Political reputation in the age of automated networks
Bots in political campaigns do not determine the outcome of an election by themselves. It would be incorrect to assume automatically that an automated network can change how voters vote.
The documentable risk is more specific: coordinated networks can artificially increase the visibility of particular narratives, make genuine consensus more difficult to interpret and contribute to the creation of a manipulated information environment.
For this reason, reputational protection cannot be limited to responding to individual false stories. It must include analysis of networks, sources, coordinated behaviour and new artificial intelligence tools.
In politics, the issue is not only what is being said, but also who is amplifying it, with what intensity and why it suddenly seems to be everywhere.
Frequently asked questions about bots in political campaigns
They are automated systems used to publish, share or interact with content. Not all bots are harmful: the risk arises when they are used to manipulate the conversation artificially.
They can amplify content and alter the perceived visibility of particular narratives. This does not mean that they can automatically determine voting behaviour or the outcome of an election.
They can increase the visibility of allegations, negative content or hostile interpretations, especially when they operate within coordinated networks.
No. A bot is defined by the automation of its activities, whereas a fake account concerns the identity being represented. A fake profile can be managed manually.
Publication frequency, message similarity, synchronisation, account characteristics and interaction structure are analysed. A single unusual behaviour is not enough to prove coordinated manipulation.
